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DON'T BELIEVE EVERYTHING YOU READ: A REVIEW OF
MODERN 'POST-CONVICTION" DNA TESTING STATUTES
KATHY SWEDLOW*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1993, over one hundred individuals have been exonerated through
the use of post-conviction DNA testing, and more individuals are being ex-
onerated daily.' The vast majority of these exonerations have occurred in the
absence of any sort of statutory or judicial guides as to when and under what
circumstances such testing should occur.
Due in large part to these exonerations, over two dozen different juris-
dictions around the United States have enacted statutes to allow convicted
prisoners access to DNA testing.! Generally speaking, these statutes set
forth circumstances under which testing may be requested and standards by
which requests for testing should be evaluated and by which relief should be
granted. There is no doubt that these statutes are revolutionary: they create a
realistic hope for some of the "wrongfully convicted,"3 erect brand new legal
* Assistant Professor of Law and Deputy Director of the Innocence Project, Thomas M.
Cooley Law School. I would like to thank Cooley Professor Norman Fell for his helpful
comments on previous drafts of this article, and Tim Innes, Head of Circulation at the Thomas
M. Cooley Law Library, for his invaluable research assistance.
1. For a complete list of these individuals, and summaries of their cases, see
http.//www.innocenceprojecLorg.
2. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-4240 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-124 to -129 (Michie
2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2001); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 4031-4035 (2001 & Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 925.1 l(1)(a) (2001); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2719 (Michie 2002) (procedures for capital cases only); IDAHo CODE § 19-4902
(Michie 2002); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/116-3 (2002); IND. CODE §§ 35-38-7-1 to -19
(2001); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 926.1 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137
(West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PRoc. § 8-201 (2001); Mica. Co'P. Laws § 770.16
(2002); MiNN. STAT. § 590.01 (2002); Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.035 (2002); NEB. REv. STAT. §
29-4117 to -4125 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
IA-1 (Michie 2001); N.Y. C~aM. PRoc. LAw § 440.30 (Consol. 2001); N.C. Gu,. STAT. §
15A-269 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1371, 1371.1 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1372
(2001); S.B. 667, 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001); TE,,NN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-401 to -413
(2002); TEx. CODE ANN. CIM. PRoc. art. 64.03 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-35a-301 to -
304 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2001); WASH. Rsv. CODE § 10.73.170 (2002);
Wisc. STAT. § 974.07 (2002).
3. As used in this Article, "wrongfully convicted" refers to those individuals who are fac-
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avenues for relief, and demand a new level of accuracy from the criminal
justice system.
However, at the same time, many of these statutes have apparently been
drafted and enacted without consideration of how they will interact with
"traditional" post-conviction remedies, which are dominated by harsh proce-
dural rules and which often function to deny petitioners substantive review.
As a result of this contradiction, those who seek to litigate DNA-innocence
cases with these "new" post-conviction statutes will need to become aware
of the pitfalls of "traditional" post-conviction litigation, for two primary rea-
sons: to ensure that these new statutes serve the purposes behind their en-
actment and to protect the defendant's rights as fully as possible, so that tra-
ditional avenues of relief are not forever foreclosed.
This Article is organized around the basic parameters of, and sequential
steps associated with, the various DNA testing statutes currently in exis-
tence." Beginning with the preliminary issues of who may seek relief and
when a petition for testing may be filed, this Article addresses major trends
and themes associated with the new testing statutes, and discusses some of
the more obvious ways in which the testing statutes may clash with tradi-
tional post-conviction remedies. In addition, the Article explores ways in
which some of the apparently more confining language of these testing stat-
utes may be expanded.'
II. PREREQUISITES TO FILING6
A. Who May File
All of the new statutes delineate who may file a petition for testing' and,
while some statutes enumerate the specific crimes or class(es) of felonies for
tually innocent of the crimes for which they have been convicted.
4. Due to the number of testing statutes and the differences between them, this Article
does not attempt to address every aspect of every statute; instead, the discussion within this
Article is restricted to those instances where the testing statutes will potentially clash with tra-
ditional post-conviction remedies. Additionally, not every testing statute is given in-depth
treatment. For example, the Oklahoma statute establishes a DNA Forensic Testing Program
within the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System and requires that its staff prioritize testing
claims. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1371, 1371.1 (2002). However, the Oklahoma statute does not
set forth standards for testing in the same way as other testing statutes, and so the Oklahoma
statute is only discussed herein to the extent it is similar to other statutes.
5. Readers are also encouraged to review other practical sources, including United States
Department of Justice, Post-Conviction DNA Testing: Recommendations for Handling Re-
quests (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles l/nij/1776.26.txt.
6. Only one statute does not contemplate filing a request for testing in court. See WASI.
REV. CODE § 10.73.170(1) (2002) (request for testing to be submitted to the county prosecu-
tor).
7. ARrz. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(A) (2002) ("a person who was convicted of and sen-
tenced for a felony offense..."); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-124 & 125 (Michie 2001) ("a
person convicted of a crime..."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(a) (West 2002) ("a person who
was convicted of a felony..."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (2001) ("a person con-
(Vol. 38
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which a petitioner must be convicted in order to file,' generally speaking, pe-
titioners seeking DNA testing will have been convicted9 of some sort of ma-
jor felony."0
victed of a crime..."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 4033 (2001 & Supp. 2002) (referring to "convic-
tion" or "adjudication" of a "crime of violence"); FLA. STAT. ch. 925.1 l(l)(a) (2001) ("a per-
son who was tried and found guilty of committing a crime, . ."); IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (Mi-
chie 2002) (referring to capital convictions only); IDAHO CODE § 19-4901 (Michic 2002)
(referring to "any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for. a crime..."): 725 ILL
Comp. STAT. § 5/116-3 (2002) (referring to a "defendant"); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-1 (2001)
(petitions for relief may only be filed by defendants convicted of murder, and Class A, B. and
C felonies); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 926.1 (A)(1) (2002) ("a person convicted of a
felony..."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (West 2001) ("[a] person convicted of a
crime under the laws of this State that carries the potential punishment of imprisonment of at
least 20 years..."); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b) (2001) ("a person who is con-
victed of a violation of Article 27 § 387, § 407, § 408, § 409, § 410, § 411. § 462, § 463. §
464, or § 46A of the Code .... ); MicH. COMP. LAws § 770.16(1) (2002) ("a defendant con-
victed of a felony.. ."); MiNN. STAT. § 590.01 (2002) ("a person convicted of a crime.. .);
Mo. REy. STAT. § 547.035(l) (2002) ("A person in the custody of the department of correc-
tions. . ."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4120(1) (2001) ("a person in custody pursuant to the judg-
ment of a court.. .");N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a(a) (West 2002) (referring to "[any person
who was convicted of a crime".. .); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-IA-l(A) (Michie 2001) ("a per-
son convicted of a criminal offense..."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 440.30(1) (Consol. 2001)
(referring to "a defendant"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a) (2002) (referring to "a defen-
dant"); OraA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1371.2 (2002) ("[a]n indigent person convicted of... any fel-
ony offense.. ."); S.B. 667 § (1)(a), 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001) (referring to "conviction
for aggravated murder" or "felony as defined in the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-403 (2002) ("a person convicted of and sentenced
for the commission of first degree murder, second degree murder, aggravated rape, rape, ag-
gravated sexual battery or rape of a child, the attempted commission of any of these offenses,
any lesser included offense of these offenses, or, at the direction of the trial judge, any other
offense..."); TEx. CODE ANN. CRMI. PROC. art. 64.03 (2002) (referring to "convicted per-
son"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(2) (2001) ("a person convicted of a felony of-
fense.. ."); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A) (2001) ("any person convicted of a felony...");
WAS H. REv. CODE § 10.73.170(l) (2002) ("a person in this state who has been convicted of a
felony"); Wisc. STAT. § 974.07(2) (2002) (referring to conviction of a "crime," adjudication
of delinquency, or a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect).
8. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4033(a) (2001 & Supp. 2002) (referring to person convicted of
"crime of violence," as defined in D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1331(4)); IDAHO CODE § 19-2719
(Michie 2002) (referring to capital convictions only); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-1 (2001) (stating
that petitions for relief may only be filed by defendants convicted of murder, and Class A, B.
and C felonies); MD. CODE ANN., CRim. PROC. § 8-201(b) (2001) ("a person who is convicted
of a violation of Article 27 § 387, § 407, § 408, § 409, § 410, § 411. § 462, § 463, § 464, or §
46A of the Code.. ."); S.B. 667 § (1)(a), 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001) (referring to "con-
viction for aggravated murder" or "felony as defined in the rules of the Oregon Criminal Jus-
tice Commission"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-403 (2002) ("a person convicted of and sen-
tenced for the commission of first degree murder, second degree murder, aggravated rape,
rape, aggravated sexual battery or rape of a child, the attempted commission of any of these
offenses, any lesser included offense of these offenses, or, at the direction of the trial judge,
any other offense...").
9. Only two statutes make a distinction between convictions and juvenile adjudications.
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 4033(a)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2002); and Wisc. STAT. § 974.07(2) (2002).
10. Some of the statutes cast the issue of "who may file" in terms of a substantive show-
ing for testing. See e.g., Mo. Rav. STAT. § 547.035 (2002) (explaining that a "person in the
custody of the department of corrections claiming that forensic DNA testing will demonstrate
the person's innocence of the crime... may file a... motion... seeking such testing...").
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Nonetheless, four distinct categories of individuals may be excluded
from testing under certain situations, despite a felony conviction. First,
while some of the new statutes do not specifically bar petitioners who have
pleaded guilty from requesting testing," the vast majority do exclude such
petitioners 2-- despite extant DNA exonerations after guilty pleas and despite
the Supreme Court's express recognition that innocent individuals can and
do plead guilty' 3-- and only a handful of these statutes specifically include
However, for the purposes of this Article, the question of "who may file" is treated separately
from the substantive requirements for testing and relief.
11. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4031-4035 (2001 & Supp. 2002); IND. CODE §§ 35-38-7-1 to -
19 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4117-4125 (2001); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (Con-
sol. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-401 to -409
(2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2002). See also
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1371-1372 (2001) (establishing DNA Forensic Testing Program
within the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, but no discrete standards given for prioritiza-
tion of claims).
12. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(C)(1)(a) (2002) (referring to "verdict"); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-112-125(b)(1) (Michie 2001) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof
that, inter alia, "identity was an issue in the trial"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1I, § 4504(a)(3)
(2001) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity was an issue
in the trial"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.11(1)(a) (2001) (referring to "a person who has been
tried and found guilty." See also Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating
Rule 3.853, 2001 WL 1276878 at *4-5 (Fla. Oct. 18, 2001) (Anstead, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (discussing statute's bar on petitioners who pleaded guilty); IDAtHO
CODE § 19-4902(c)(I) (Michie 2002) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof that,
inter alia, "identity was an issue in the trial"); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/116-3(b)(1) (2002)
(requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity was the issue in the
trial"); LA. CODE CRI. PRoc. ANN. art. 926.1(B)(1) (2002) (referring to evidence "intro-
duced at trial"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(4)(E) (West 2001) (requiring petitioner
to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity of the person... was at issue during the
person's trial"); MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. PRoc. § 8-201(c)(4) (2001) (requiring petitioner to
present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity was an issue in the trial"); MICH. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 770.16(3)(b)(iii) (2002) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof that,
inter alia, "identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime was at issue during his or
her trial"); MINN. STAT. § 590.01(la)(2)(b)(1) (2002) (requiring petitioner to present prima
facie proof that, inter alia, "identity was an issue in the trial"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.035(4)
(2002) (motion for testing must allege, inter alia, that "identity was an issue at trial); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a(a)(1)(a) (West 2002) (petitioner to explain, inter alia, "why the
identity of the defendant was a significant issue in the case"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31- 1A-
1(C)(3) (Michie 2001) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "iden-
tity was an issue in the initial trial"); S.B. 667 § (1)(b)(A)(i), 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001)
(non-mentally retarded defendant must demonstrate, inter alia, that "identity... was at issue
in the trial"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(2)(c) (2001) (petitioner must assert, inter alia,
a "theory of defense, not inconsistent with theories previously asserted at trial").
13. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (defendant who protests his innocence
may voluntarily plead guilty, where defendant is represented by competent counsel and record
evinces his guilt). See also Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Criminal Law: The Conse-
quences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age
of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (quantitative
study of false confessions) and GIsi H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS,
CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY (1996) (discussing psychological testing techniques to reveal
false confessions and pleas).
[Vol. 38
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petitioners who are no longer in custody" or those who seek to challenge one
conviction while serving a sentence for a second conviction, regardless of
whether the second conviction is related or unrelated.' While some form of
"custody" is normally a jurisdictional prerequisite in traditional post-
conviction litigation, 9 a good argument can be made that these testing stat-
utes should not be similarly restricted, insofar as many of these statutes were
enacted to correct systemic problems within the criminal justice system. In
any event, in those jurisdictions where the testing statute is silent concerning
custody, litigators may wish to be aware of their individual state's post-
conviction requirements regarding custody.
B. Timing of Filing
While traditional post-conviction practice generally contemplates that a
petitioner will pursue relief only after the conclusion of direct appeal,' many
of the new statutes allow a petitioner to seek relief at any time after convic-
tion ' or sentencing,' and only a minority of statutes anticipate that a peti-
tioner will seek relief at the conclusion of direct appeal."
or grant a new trial or correct the sentence or make other disposition as appropriate"); Na.
RFay. STAT. § 29-4120 (2001) (court to make determination for testing based upon review of
"exculpatory evidence relevant to the claim that the person was wrongfully convicted or sen-
tenced"); S.B. 667, 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001) ("There is a reasonable probability that
the testing will produce exculpatory evidence that would establish the innocence of the person
of... conduct, if the exoneration of the person of the conduct would result in a mandatory
reduction in the person's sentence").
17. See e.g., S.B. 667 § 1(b), 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001) (petition may be filed by
convicted person no longer in custody). For a more complete discussion of the "custody" re-
quirement and its evolution, see JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAs
CoRPus PRAcncE A'ND PRocEDURE 359-401 (4th ed. 2001).
18. Maine appears to be the only jurisdiction which has directly addressed this issue in
its testing statute. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (West 2001) (petitioner must be in
actual execution of sentence for challenged conviction, or be facing execution of sentence in
the future).
19. LrEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 17.
20. Exceptions to this practice may be found in those jurisdictions which follow some
sort of "unitary review" scheme, whereby a defendant pursues his direct appeal and his state
post-conviction remedies at the same time. See, e.g., Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 743
n.1 (1998) ("It is undisputed here that California is a unitary review State, which is a State
that allows prisoners to raise collateral challenges in the course of direct review of the judg-
ment, such that all claims may be raised in a single state appeal.") (statutory citations omit-
ted).
21. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4031-4035 (2001 & Supp. 2002); LA. CODE CRIuM. PROC. A,,.
art. 926.1 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., CRtm. PRoc. § 8-201 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 590.01
(2002); Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.035 (2002); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4117 to -4125 (2001); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2002); TEx. CODE ANN. CRLM. PRoc. art. 64.03 (2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-35a-301 to -304 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2001): Wisc. STAT. §
974.07 (2002).
22. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-4240 (2002); CAL PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2002); FLA.
STAT. ch. 925.11 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-4901 (Michie 2002); 725 ILL CO.MtP. STAT. §
5/116-3 (2002); IND. CODE §§ 35-38-7-1 to -19 (2001); LA. CODE CRUMs. PROc. ANN. art.
[Vol. 38
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them."4 Only one state, Missouri, appears to both include and exclude peti-
tioners who have pleaded guilty. 5
Second, many statutes refer only to individuals who seek complete ex-
oneration, leaving aside those petitioners who may not assert their actual in-
nocence but who instead seek to reduce or mitigate their sentencing expo-
sure. 6 Third and fourth, few of the current statutes address the situation of
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(c)(1)(A) (West 2002) (requiring petitioner to demonstrate
why "identity ... was, or should have been, a significant issue in the case"). See also id. §
1405(e) (stating that petition for testing shall be "heard by the judge who conducted the trial,
or accepted the convicted person's plea of guilty or nolo contendere"); D.C. CODE ANN. §
4033(b)(4) (2001 & Supp. 2002) (requiring petitioner to explain, inter alia, "how the DNA
evidence would help establish that the applicant is actually innocent despite having been con-
victed at trial or having pled guilty"); S.B. 667 § (1)(b)(A)(ii), 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or.
2001) (petition for testing by petitioner who pleaded guilty will only be considered when peti-
tioner was documented as mentally retarded at the time the crime was committed); TEX. CODE
ANN. CRITA. PRoc. art. 64.03(b) (2002) ("[a] convicted person who pleaded guilty or nolo con-
tendere in the case may submit a motion under this chapter...").
15. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.035(2)(4) (2002) (requiring petitioner to present
prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity was an issue in the trial"), with id. § 547.035(5)
(after court issues order to show cause why motion for testing should not be granted, which
necessarily requires showing that "identity was an issue in the trial," court reporter may be
directed to prepare the transcript of the movant's guilty plea).
16. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4031-4035 (2001 & Supp. 2002) (no reference to
mitigation or reduction of sentence); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2001) (also not refer-
encing mitigation or reduction of sentence); IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2719, 19-4901 (Michie 2002)
(also lacking above references); 725 ILL. CoMTn,. STAT. § 5/116-3 (2002) (also lacking refer-
ences); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 926.1 (2002) (no reference to mitigation or reduction of
sentence); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (West 2001) (no reference); MicH. COMP.
LAWS § 770.16 (2002) (no reference); Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.035 (2002) (same references
lacking); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a (West 2002) (also no reference); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
31-1A-1 (Michie 2001) (no references); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 440.30 (Consol. 2001) (also
lacking reference); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2002) (lacking same reference); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22, §§ 1371.1, 1371.2 (2002) (similar references missing); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-
401 to -409 (2002) (also lacking references); TEX. CODE ANN. CRtm. PROC. art. 64.03 (2002)
(same references lacking); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-35a-301 to -304 (2001) (no reference to
mitigation or reduction of sentence); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327. 1 (2001) (also lacking refer-
ences); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2002) (also no reference); and Wisc. STAT. § 974.07
(2002) (no references to mitigation or reduction of sentence); with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
4240(C)(1)(a) (2002) (referring to "reasonable probability that ... the petitioner's verdict or
sentence would have been more favorable"); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-124(a) (Michie
2001) (proceeding to secure relief may be commenced to "discharge the petitioner or resen-
tence the petitioner or grant a new trial or correct the sentence"); CAL. PENAL CODE §
1405(c)(1)(B) (West 2002) (referring to explanation of how the "requested DNA testing
would raise a reasonable probability that the convicted person's verdict or sentence would be
more favorable"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 4033(b)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2002) (referring to "actual
innocence"); FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11(2)(a)(3) (2001) (referring to "statement that the sentenced
defendant is innocent and how the DNA testing requested by the petition will exonerate the
defendant of the crime for which the defendant was sentenced or will mitigate the sentence
received by the defendant for that crime"); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-8(4)(B) (2001) (referring to a
"reasonable probability ... that the petitioner would not have received as severe a sentence
for the offense"); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(a)(3)(iii) (2001) (referring to "miti-
gating evidence relevant to a claim of a convicted person of wrongful conviction or sentenc-
ing"); MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (2002) (proceeding to secure relief may be commenced to "va-
cate and set aside the judgment and to discharge the petitioner or to resentence the petitioner
6
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At first blush, this might not seem to be problematic: many of the cur-
rent exonerations occurred years after the prisoner had exhausted his tradi-
tional legal remedies, and so it may seem inconsequential whether the re-
quest for testing be filed after conviction, sentencing, or direct appeal.
However, in a case with a recent conviction, disastrous problems can arise if
the petitioner's traditional rights are not protected during the pursuit of DNA
testing.
For example, under the Tennessee testing statute, a petition for testing
may be filed any time after sentencing. ' Tennessee law also mandates that
notices of appeal be generally filed within thirty days of the date of entry of
judgment from which appeal is taken,' and that state post-conviction peti-
tions be filed within one year of the date the defendant's conviction becomes
final, or one year from the date in which to seek direct appeal expires. :6 At
the same time, it is clear that the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure
contemplate only three types of post-trial motions in criminal cases: motions
in arrest of judgment, motions for acquittal, and motions for a new trial.'
Given these constraints, it is possible to imagine a scenario where a mo-
tion for DNA testing is filed directly after sentencing and, during the course
of litigation, the time limits for filing a direct appeal and/or state post-
conviction petition expire. If the motion for testing is ultimately denied-
because, for example, the evidence was destroyed-it is unclear whether that
motion will toll the time for filing a notice of appeal under the court rules,
especially given the fact that a motion for testing is not contemplated by the
Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure as a post-trial motion.
These issues become even more complex when the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") is inserted into the equation. Un-
der the AEDPA, petitioners are required to file their federal habeas corpus
926.1 (2002); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tiL 15, § 2137 (West 2001); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 770.16
(2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4117 to -4125 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a (West
2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1371, 1371.1, 1371.2 (2002); S.B. 667, 2001 Leg., 71st Sess.
(Or. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-401 to - 409 (2002); WASH. REy. CODE § 10.73.170
(2002). See also IDAHO CODE § 19-4901 (Michie 2002) (capital petitioner must file legal or
factual challenge within forty-two days of date of sentencing).
23. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-124 to -129 (Michie 2001); DEL CODE ANN. § 4504
(2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-4902 (Michie 2002); MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (2002); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-IA-1 (Michie 2001); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 440.30 (Consol. 2001).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-403 (2002).
25. TENN. R. APP. PROC., Rule 4(a) (2001). However, Rule 4(a) makes clear that notices
of appeal are "not jurisdictional and the filing of such document may be waived in the interest
of justice." Id. See also DAvID Louis RAYBIN, TENNESSEE CRIMtNAL PRACTICE AND
PRocEDuRE § 33.105 (1985 & 2002 Supp.).
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-202(a) (2002). The Tennessee Code clearly states that the
statute of limitations for filing a traditional post-conviction petition "shall not be tolled for
any reason." Id. But see Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001) (recognizing the
"unambiguous" language of § 40-30-202(a), but remanding for evidentiary hearing on issue
of whether post-conviction petition was untimely filed due to "possible misrepresentation of
[prior] counsel" concerning mandatory appellate process).
27. RAYBIN, supra note 25, § 33.1 (discussing three types of motions).
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petitions within one year of the date their convictions become final." How-
ever, while this one-year time limit may be statutorily tolled during the
pendency of any "properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review,"29 no court has yet spoken to the issue of how these
new DNA testing statutes will be considered under the AEDPA. While a
strong argument can be made that these new statutes are "applications...
for other collateral review" within the meaning of section 2244(d)(2)--and
that requests for testing filed in state court would statutorily toll AEDPA's
one-year statute of limitations-that argument is predicated upon the asser-
tion of a federal constitutional error within the state-filed request for DNA
testing." In other words, absent assertion of federal constitutional error
within the motion for testing, the AEDPA time limits will not be statutorily
tolled, and the petitioner will lose review of his claims in federal court.
Maine is the only jurisdiction with a statute drafted to directly address
some of these problems. Under the Maine statute, a petitioner may request
testing at any time after sentencing,31 which means that the petitioner may
have a direct appeal or state post-conviction petition pending at the time he
requests testing--or, because of jurisdictional time bars associated with
these legal vehicles, he may be required to file a direct appeal or state post-
conviction, in order to preserve his rights. At the same time, Maine's testing
statute mandates that the motion for testing will be "automatically stayed"
pending resolution of a direct appeal or state post-conviction petition, unless
a court directs otherwise. 2 While this presumption favoring exhaustion of
traditional remedies over testing is less than ideal for the factually innocent
prisoner-because it forces him to remain incarcerated for a longer period of
time-the "automatic stay" provisions will at least preserve that prisoner's
rights to traditional litigation.
C. Time Limits on Filing
Some of the new statutes mimic traditional post-conviction statutes in-
sofar as they place time limits on the filing of applications for testing, i.e.,
they impose time limits based upon either the date of conviction or the date
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2002).
29. Id. § 2244(d)(2).
30. Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 1999). See also Elliot v. Dewitt, 10 Fed.
Appx. 311 (6th Cir. 2001).
31. The Maine statute allows two classes of sentenced prisoners to request DNA testing:
those who have been convicted and are currently serving the sentence for that conviction, and
those who are serving a sentence for a conviction but who seek to challenge a separate
conviction, the sentence for which is to be served in the future. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 2137 (West 2001).
32. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(12) ("Exhaustion") (West 2001). If the peti-
tioner has a direct appeal pending, this request must be presented to the Supreme Judicial
Court. Id. If the petitioner has a state post-conviction petition pending, this request must be
presented to the judge to whom the post-conviction petition is assigned. Id.
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the petitioner's conviction becomes final. 3 While a larger number of stat-
utes impose no limits at all-allowing a petitioner to pursue relief under the
statute at any time, assuming he is otherwise eligible-a handful of these
new statutes contain sunset provisions, which provide that all applications
for testing must be filed by a date certain.' Finally, some jurisdictions ap-
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (2001) (petition "may not be filed more than 3
years after the judgment of conviction is final"); FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11 (1)(b) 1 (2001). Under
the Florida statute, the petition testing may be filed:
[w]ithin 2 years following the date that the judgment and sentence in the case be-
comes final if no direct appeal is taken, within 2 years following the date that the
conviction is affirmed on direct appeal if an appeal is taken, within 2 years follow-
ing the date that collateral counsel is appointed or retained subsequent to the con-
viction being affirmed on direct appeal in a capital case ....
Id.
IDAHO CODE § 19-4902(a) (Michie 2002) ("An application may be filed at any time within
one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal
or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.. .'I; LA.
CODE CRim. PRoc. ANN. art. 926. I(A)(1) & (2) (2002) (person convicted of a non-capital fel-
ony must file petition by August 31, 2005, but capital petitioners may file "at any time");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301 to -304 (2001).
34. AiZ. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(A) (2002) (no discussion of time limits); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-112-125 (Michie 2001) (same); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2002) (same);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4031-4035 (2001 & Supp. 2002) (same); 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. § 5/116-
3 (2002) (same); IND. CODE §§ 35-38-7-1 to -19 (2001) (same); LA. CODE CRiws. PROC. ANN'.
art. 926.1(A)(1) & (2) (2002) (person convicted of a non-capital felony must file petition by
August 31, 2005, but capital petitioners may file "at any time"); MD. CODE AN?.., CRiM.
PRoc. § 8-201 (2001) (no discussion of time limits); MiNN. STAT. § 590.01(1) (2002) (same);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.035 (2002) (same); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4117 to -4125 (2001)
(same); NJ. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a (West 2002) (same); N.Y. CRli. PROC. LAw § 440.30
(Consol. 2001) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2002) (same); TEN'. CODE ANN. §§ 40-
30-401 to -409 (2002) (same); Tax. CODE ANN. CRMI. PROC. art. 64.03 (2002) (same); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2001) (same). See also People v. Rokita, 736 N.E.2d 205 (ill. App.
Ct 2000). In Rokita, the court discussed Illinois testing statute and explained.
[t]here is no language in section 116-3 indicating any legislative intent to impose a
time limit for filing a motion for forensic testing. Had the legislature wished to
impose a time limit on the filing of a section 116-3 motion, it could easily have
done so. It is not the prerogative of this court to read into the statute limitations
that the legislature chose not to include.
Id. at 213.
See also Wisc. STAT. § 974.07 (2002) (no discussion of time limits).
35. FLA. STAT. ch. § 925.1 1(1)(b)(1) (2001) (petition for testing must be filed by October
1, 2003); IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (Michie 2002) (petitions from capital prisoners to be filed
within forty-two days of date of sentencing or by July 1. 2002, whichever is later); LA. CODE
CRim. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1(A)(1) (2002) (petitions in non-capital cases must be filed by Au-
gust 31, 2005); Mtc. CoMP. LAws § 770.16(1) (2002) (petition for testing "shall be filed not
later than January 1, 2006"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-l(H) (Michie 2001) (petition "shall"
be filed "prior to July 1, 200T' and no applications shall be accepted after that date); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, § 1371 (2002) ("Oklahoma Indigent Defense System DNA Forensic Testing
Program to continue until July 1, 2005"); S.B. 667, 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001) (motion
for testing must be filed "no later than 48 months after the effective date" of the statute);
WASH. REv. CODE § 10.73.170(1) (2002) (requests to be filed "(oin or before December 31.
2004;" after January 1, 2005, requests for testing must be raised at trial or on direct appeal).
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pear to have adopted a hybrid approach, requiring evaluation of the particu-
lar statute's use after a particular period of time has elapsed. 6
D. Appointment of Counsel
Most statutes expressly provide for the appointment of counsel," but
many do not have similar within-statute provisions." However, regardless of
These sunset provisions are patently ridiculous, and pose a very real barrier for relief.
Consider the comments of the Cardozo Innocence Project regarding its own experiences in
investigating cases, presented in response to Florida's proposed two-year sunset provision.
which was eventually enacted: "In general, unless the inmate is fortunate enough to have a
post-conviction attorney (and virtually none of the non-capital clients do), at least a year and a
half is spent gathering enough information so we can first begin a meaningful evaluation
process." Comments of the Innocence Project, filed August 15, 2001, at 4 (emphasis in origi-
nal), available at http://www.flcourts.org/pubinfo/summariesbriefs/0 1/01 -363/ Filed-
(08-15-2001)_ InnocenceProject.pdf.
36. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(15) (West 2001). The Maine statute does not
provide time limits, but
[b]eginning January 2003 and annually thereafter, the Department of Public Safety
shall report on post-conviction DNA analysis to the joint standing committee of
the Legislature having jurisdiction over criminal matters. The report must include
the number of postjudgment of conviction analyses completed, costs of the analy-
ses and the results. The report also may include recommendations to improve the
postjudgment of conviction analysis process.
Id.
See also S.B. 667 §5, 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001) (setting forth six criteria by which
the statute is to be periodically evaluated).
37. ARrZ. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(E) (2002) (counsel may be appointed for indigent pris-
oner "at any time" during proceedings); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-125 (Michie 2001) (indi-
gent prisoner "who desires to pursue the remedy" within the statute may request appointment
of counsel); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(b)(3)(a) (West 2002) (counsel shall be appointed for
indigent prisoner whose initial pleading meets certain minimal standards); D.C. CODE ANN. §
4033(e)(2) (2001 & Supp. 2002) (court may appoint counsel for indigent petitioner); FLA.
STAT. ch. 925.11(2)(6)(e) (2001) (counsel may be appointed to assist indigent defendant if
petition proceedings to hearing and if court finds such assistance necessary); IND. CODE § 35-
38-7-11 (2001) (counsel may be appointed to an indigent defendant "at any time" during the
proceedings); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(3) (West 2001) (counsel may be appointed
"at any time" for indigent defendant); MICH. Com'. LAWS § 770.16(7) (2002) (counsel shall
be appointed to file motion for new trial only after testing exonerates petitioner); Mo. Rev.
STAT. § 547.035(6) (2002) (counsel shall be appointed if hearing is convened on petition);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-4117 to -4122 (2001) (court shall appoint counsel upon demonstra-
tion that DNA testing "may be relevant" to claim of wrongful conviction); N.J. STAT. ANN.
2A:84A-32a(b)(1) (West 2002) (court shall appoint counsel for indigent prisoner who re-
quests testing); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(c) (2002) (court shall appoint counsel to indigent
petitioner); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1371-1372 (2001) (authorizing Oklahoma Indigent De-
fense System to investigate claims of wrongful conviction); S.B. 667 § 4, 2001 Leg.. 71st
Sess. (Or. 2001) (creating mechanisms for the appointment of counsel); TENN. CODE ANN. §
40-30-407 (2002) ("Appointment of counsel for indigents"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-302
(2001) (appointment of counsel governed by §§ 78-35a-109(1) & (2)); Wisc. STAr. §
947.07(11) (2002) (court to appoint counsel to indigent petitioner).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. § 4504 (2001) (statute refers to testing and relief procedures only);
IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (Michie 2002) (same); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/116-3 (2002)
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whether a particular statute provides for counsel or not, the mere fact that
most petitioners will be seeking relief after the expiration of their direct ap-
peal rights means that any right to counsel will necessarily be curtailed. The
recent Illinois case of People v. Love39 demonstrates how and why.
In Love, the petitioner sought DNA testing under the Illinois testing
statute five years after his original conviction and one year after the conclu-
sion of his state post-conviction proceedings. ' Despite the fact that the Illi-
nois statute has no provision for the right to counsel, the trial court appointed
counsel to assist Love."' At a hearing on Love's motion for testing, at which
Love was not present, the State argued that all of the blood evidence had
been destroyed and that regardless, the issue of the destruction of the blood
evidence had been previously litigated on direct appeal and in the previous
post-conviction proceedings. ' When asked by the court whether a factual
hearing needed to be convened to determine whether the blood evidence had
been destroyed, Love's appointed counsel acquiesced, and the petition was
dismissed.'3
On appeal, Love argued that his appointed counsel had been ineffective
for not requesting a hearing." However, the appellate court disagreed, find-
ing that because Love had no constitutional right to counsel, he had no ac-
companying right to the effective assistance of counsel.' 5 Moreover, because
the Illinois testing statute did not even confer a statutory right to counsel,
Love was not even entitled to a "reasonable level of assistance;" instead, all
that Love was entitled to was the mere appointment of counsel, which he had
received.'
(same); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoC. arL 926.1 (2002) (same); MD. CODE ANN., Csi.\. PRoc. § 8-
201 (2001) (same); MiNN. STAT. § 590.01 (2002) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-lA-I (Mi-
chie 2001) (same); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAw § 440.30 (Consol. 2001) (same); TEx. CODE ANN.
CRM. PRoc. art. 64.03 (2002) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2001) (same); WASH.
REv. CODE § 10.73.170 (2002) (same).
39. People v. Love, 727 N.E.2d 680 (111. App. CL 2000).
40. Id at 681-82.
41. Id. at 682.
42. Id.
43. Id. Appointed counsel filed a motion for reconsideration "but made no argument in
the motion or at the hearing;" the motion was denied. Id.
44. Id. at 683.
45. Id. at 682-83. See also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1. 10 (1989) (finding no right
to counsel for death row inmates in postconviction proceedings); and Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding the right to counsel does not apply further than during de-
fendant's trial and right to first appeal). For a complete discussion of procedural due process
and Sixth Amendment arguments in support of a right to counsel in post-conviction proceed-
ings, see HERiz & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at 324-57 (discussing Coleman. Murray, and
Finley in detail); Daniel Givelber, Symposium Gideon-A Generation Later: The Right to
Counsel in Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58 MD. L. REv. 1393 (1999).
46. Love, 727 N.E.2d at 683 (citing, inter alia, Bounds v. Smith. 430 U.S. 817 (1977)).
While it is well established that counsel may not be deemed ineffective on post-conviction
review, the Utah and Virginia testing statutes expressly state that a petitioner cannot claim
ineffectiveness of his appointed post-conviction counsel. UTAH CODE A',N. § 78-35a- 109(3)
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Similar problems can arise even when the petition for testing is filed
during a time when the petitioner retains his Sixth Amendment rights. For
example, in Nebraska, a petitioner may file his petition for testing at any
time after conviction. '7 While the Nebraska statute provides a statutory fight
to counsel for a petitioner requesting testing,0 counsel's appointment prior to
the time when the petitioner's conviction becomes final will presumably be
subject to Sixth Amendment effectiveness considerations. 9
However, what happens if the petition is dismissed before testing is ever
ordered due, as the petitioner in Love alleged, to an error on the part of coun-
sel? While the Nebraska testing statute is silent regarding the filing of suc-
cessive testing petitions, Nebraska law makes clear that successive petitions
filed under the traditional post-conviction statute will not be entertained
"unless the motion affirmatively shows on its face that the basis relied upon
for relief was not available at the time the movant filed the prior motion;"5
in other words, traditional successive petitions will be considered only under
exceptional circumstances.' Thus, the only chance of success-defined in
terms of access to testing-for this petitioner may be either to hope that his
direct appeal rights have been preserved so that he can request testing during
those proceedings, or to hope that the court will consider a successive peti-
tion for testing.
III. PREREQUISITES TO TESTING
A. Standards for Testing
All of the statutes delineate standards for testing; the difference between
the statutes rests mainly on how many different types of demonstrations the
petitioner is required to make: depending on the jurisdiction, he may have to
make as few as three, or as many as eight. Additionally, some statutes man-
date testing upon a specific showing by the petitioner only, and others con-
(2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(G) (2001).
47. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120 (2001).
48. Id. § 29-4122.
49. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 ("We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional
right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions ... and we decline to
so hold today. Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first ap-
peal of right, and no further.") (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,488 (1969)).
50. State v. Hunt, 634 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Neb. 2001) (citations omitted).
51. See, e.g., State v. Parmar, 639 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Neb. 2002).
The Nebraska Postconviction Act... is available to a defendant to show that his or
her conviction was obtained in violation of his or her constitutional rights. ...
However, the need for finality in the criminal process requires that a defendant
bring all claims for relief at the first opportunity .... The act specifically provides
that a "court need not entertain a second motion or successive motions for similar
relief on behalf of the same prisoner."
Id. (statutory and case citations omitted).
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template testing after a specific showing by the petitioner followed by addi-
tional findings by the court.'
1. Materiality
All the statutes require some sort of demonstration of materiality by the
petitioner, or a materiality finding by the court, prior to the issuance of an
order for testing. The statutes differ, however, in the proof that a petitioner
must offer to demonstrate materiality.
For example, the majority of statutes rest the materiality showing on a
demonstration that the testing will produce "new" and "noncumulative" evi-
denceY Under this version of materiality, the petitioner will have to show
an enhancement in technology or that some item of evidence was collected
during the crime investigation, but was never tested at the time of the origi-
nal conviction.
52. Compare, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-lA-I (Michie 2001) (setting forth eight items
that petitioner must be prove by clear and convincing evidence, and two separate findings that
must be made by the court as a prerequisite to testing), with MicH. Co.stp. LAws § 770.16
(2002) (court shall order testing if petitioner offers proof as set forth in statute; court is not
required to make any additional findings as a prerequisite to ordering testing).
53. Some statutes employ several standards at the same time. See, e.g. N.J. STAT. ANN.
2A:84A-32a(d)(4) (West 2002) (use of materiality standard); id. § (d)(5) (results of testing
must raise a "reasonable probability" that motion for new trial would be granted, assuming
results favorable to the petitioner).
54. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-125(c)(1)(B) (petitioner to make prima facie presenta-
tion that, inter alia, "the testing has the scientific potential to produce new noncumulative
evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence"); DEt. COD
ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a)(5) (2001) (petitioner to make prima facie presentation that, inter alia,
"the requested testing has the scientific potential to produce new noncumulative evidence ma-
terially relevant to the person's assertion of actual innocence"); D.C. Coon AN'. § 4033(d)
(2001 & Supp. 2002) (court to order testing upon finding that, inter alia, "there is a reason-
able probability that testing will produce new non-cumulative evidence..."); IDAto CODE §
19-4902(d)(1) (Michie 2002) (court to permit testing upon finding that, inter alia, "testing has
the scientific potential to produce new noncumulative evidence that would show that it is
more probable than not that the petitioner is innocence"); 725 ILL COu'. STAT. § 5/116-
3(c)(1) (2002) (court to allow testing upon finding that, inter alia, "the testing has the scien-
tific potential to produce new noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's
assertion of actual innocence"); MiNN. STAT. § 590.01.Ia(c)(2) (2002) (petitioner to make
prima facie presentation that, inter alia, "the testing has the scientific potential to produce
new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual inno-
cence"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4120(5) (2001) (court shall order testing upon finding that,
inter alia, "testing may produce noncumulative evidence relevant to the claim that the person
was wrongfully convicted or sentenced"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-IA-I(D)(1) (Michie 2001)
(court to grant testing upon finding that, inter alia, testing "has the scientific potential to pro-
duce new, noncumulative evidence material to the petitioner's assertion of innocence. ..)-
UTAH CODE AN. § 78-35a-301(2)(e) (2001) (petitioner must allege, inter alia that "the evi-
dence that is the subject of the request has the potential to produce new, noncumulative evi-
dence that will establish the person's innocence"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(iii)
(2001) (petitioner may submit application for testing if, inter alia, "The testing is materially
relevant, noncumulative, and necessary and may prove the convicted person's actual inno-
cence").
13
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Other statutes describe materiality as just that: materiality.5 Presuma-
bly, this definition is identical to the familiar standard under Brady v. Mary-
land and its progeny: that evidence is material when it establishes a "reason-
able probability" of a different outcome."
In contrast, to obtain testing in Arizona, Tennessee, Texas, and Wiscon-
sin, a petitioner is required to demonstrate materiality by showing that he
would not have been prosecuted for the offense in question-an odd re-
quirement, especially in light of the fact that the prisoner is required to make
this showing before testing can be ordered, rather than after the test results
exonerate him. 7 Moreover, given the high rate of confessions, statements,
and eyewitness identification in DNA exoneration cases, it is difficult to
imagine how a petitioner requesting testing could make such a showing if he
faces any opposition from a prosecutor." Luckily, however, all of the stat-
55. IND. CODE §§ 35-38-7-8(1)(A)-(B) (2001) (petitioner must present prima facie proof
that "the material sought to be tested is material to identifying [him] as the perpetrator of...
or accomplice to... the offense that resulted in [his] conviction"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 2138(4)(A) (West 2002) (petitioner must present prima facie evidence that "the material
sought to be analyzed is material to the issue of the person's identity as the perpetrator of, or
accomplice to, the crime that resulted in the conviction"); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-
201(c)(5) (2001) (court shall order testing if it determines that, inter alia, "a reasonable prob-
ability exists that the DNA test has the scientific potential to produce results materially rele-
vant to the petitioner's assertion of innocence"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16(3)(a) (2002)
(court shall order testing after petitioner presents prima facie proof that, inter alia, "the evi-
dence sought to be tested is material to the issue of the convicted person's identity as the per-
petrator of, or accomplice to, the crime that resulted in the conviction"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
2A:84A-32a(d)(4) (West 2002) ("convicted person" must present prima facie case that, inter
alia, "the evidence sought to be tested is material to the issue of the convicted person's iden-
tity as the offender.. ."); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327. l(A)(iii) (2001) (petitioner may submit
application for testing if, inter alia, "the testing is materially relevant, noncumulative, and
necessary and may prove the convicted person's actual innocence").
56. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). See also Larry A. Yackle,
Congressional Power to Require DNA Testing, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2001) (cit-
ing Strickler); Christopher P. DelRosso & Samuel F. Ernst, Thirtieth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure, I. Preliminary Proceedings: Discovery, 89 GEo. L.J. 1343 (2001) (dis-
cussing Brady materiality in depth).
57. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(B)(1) (2002) (court shall order testing upon finding that,
inter alia, "a reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted
or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through deoxyribonucleic acid testing");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-404(1) (2002) (court shall order testing upon finding that, inter
alia, "[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or
convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing"); TEX. CODE ANN.
CRIM. PROC. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (2002) (court shall order testing upon demonstration by a
preponderance that, inter alia, "[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not
have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
testing"); WISC. STAT. 974.07(7)(a)(1) (2002) ("It is reasonably probable that the movant
would not have been prosecuted, convicted, found not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect, or adjudicated delinquent...").
58. The recent exoneration of Bruce Godschalk in Pennsylvania demonstrates just why
this standard is so problematic. Even after two DNA tests exonerated Godschalk, who had
falsely confessed to two rapes, Montgomery County District Attorney Bruce Castor initially
refused to consent to Godschalk's release, explaining that he had "no scientific basis" to dis-
agree with the test results, but that he placed more trust in his "detective and [the] tape-
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utes which make use of this standard also provide for an alternative demon-
stration: that the petitioner would not have been convicted of the offense in
question, a far less onerous standard." Regardless of which materiality stan-
dard is used, it is notable that many of these statutes describe the materiality
showing in terms of a "reasonable probability. ' " This is identical to the
recorded confession." "Therefore," according to Castor. "the results must be flawed until
someone proves... otherwise." See, e.g., Sara Rimer, Convict's DNA Sways Labs, Not a De-
termined Prosecutor, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 6, 2002, at A 14.
59. AR. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(B)(1) (2002) (court shall order testing upon finding that,
inter alia, "a reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted
or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through deoxyribonucleic acid testing")
(emphasis added); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(c)(1)(B) (West 2002) (petitioner must explain
why, inter alia, "in light of all of the evidence, how the requested DNA testing would raise a
reasonable probability that the convicted person's verdict or sentence would be more favor-
able if the results of DNA testing had been available at the time of the conviction"); FLA.
STAT. ch. 925.11(2)(f)(3) (2001) (court to make findings concerning whether, inter alia,
"there is a reasonable probability that the sentenced defendant would have been acquitted or
could have received a lesser sentence if the evidence had been admitted at trial"); Mo. Rav.
STAT. § 547.035 (2002) (petitioner must allege, inter alia, that "[a] reasonable probability ex-
ists that [he] would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through
the requested DNA testing."); N.Y. CGuM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a) (Consol. 2001) (court to
order testing upon finding, inter alia, that "there exists a reasonable probability that the ver-
dict would have been more favorable to the defendant"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(b)(2)
(2002) (court to grant testing if, inter alia, "[i]f the DNA tested had been conducted on the
evidence [at trial], there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant"); S.B. 667, 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001) ("[t]here is a reason-
able probability that the testing will produce exculpatory evidence that would establish the
innocence of the person of... the offense for which the person was convicted"); TENN'. CODE
ANN. § 40-30-404(1) (2002) (court shall order testing upon finding that, inter alia, "[al rea-
sonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if
exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing") (emphasis added); Tx. CODE
ANN. CRm. PRoc. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (2002) (court shall order testing upon demonstration by
a preponderance that, inter alia, "[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would
not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
testing") (emphasis added); Wisc. STAT. § 974.07(7)(a)(1) (2002) ("It is reasonably probable
that the movant would not have been prosecuted, convicted, found not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect, or adjudicated delinquent...."). See also LA. CODE CRL.t. PROC.
ANN. art. 926.1(c)(1) (2002) (referring to "reasonable likelihood that the requested DNA test-
ing will resolve the doubt and establish the innocence of the petitioner"); N.M. STAT. A,',,%. §§
31-1A-l(B)(7) & (13)(8) (Michie 2001). Under the New Mexico statute, a petitioner must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that, inter alia,
the evidence he wants the court to order DNA testing upon will be highly likely to
produce evidentiary results that would have been admissible at petitioner's initial
trial; and if the evidence he wants the court to order DNA testing upon had been
admitted at the petitioner's original trial, a reasonable judge or jury would not have
been able to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
See also WAsH. REv. CODE § 10.73.170(2) (2002) (requiring prosecutor to determine
whether testing would "demonstrate innocence on a more likely than not basis").
60. The Texas statute intermingles the "reasonable probability" standard with the proof
by a preponderance standard. See TEx. CODE ANN. CPI. PRoc. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (2002).
Accordingly, it is unclear how the Strickland-like prejudice standard would apply to Texas
cases, given that the Strickland Court expressly rejected proof by a preponderance. See infra
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prejudice standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington:6 a reasonable prob-
ability that confidence in the outcome of the trial has been undermined.'
B. Chain of Custody
In one form or another, virtually all of the statutes require proof of an
unbroken chain of evidence, with some statutes placing the burden directly
note 62.
61. 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984). See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (af-
firming Strickland test, including prejudice standard, for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims).
62. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984). See also Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362 (2000) (affirming Strickland's two-pronged test). In attempting to draw an ap-
propriate line for the prejudice inquiry, the Strickland Court first rejected the suggestion that
prejudice be found when the defendant showed "that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (explaining that, "virtually
every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, and not every error that conceivably
could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding")
(citations omitted). In the Court's eyes, this definition was both "inadequate" and unwork-
able, because it provides no metric by which to assess the magnitude of attorney error. Id. at
693 ("Since any error, if it is indeed an error, 'impairs' the presentation of the defense, the
proposed standard is inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are
sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding.").
The Court likewise rejected the outcome determinative test-that the defendant show that
counsel's deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome-finding it "not
quite appropriate." As the Court explained, this "high standard" "presupposes that all the es-
sential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceed-
ing whose result is challenged." Id. at 694 (citing United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106,
112 (1946)). In other words, because a petitioner who asserts a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel is essentially asserting a lack of reliability in the proceedings, a test which presup-
poses the reliability of the proceedings cannot suffice.
Thus, the Court settled on a definition of prejudice that addressed these concerns, borrow-
ing from the materiality standard for claims made under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). As the Court explained, a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Continuing, the Court explained that "a reasonable prob-
ability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. Inherent in
this definition is the principle that a defendant need not demonstrate prejudice by, for exam-
ple, a preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, Strickland-and later Williams-expressly so
stated. As the Court explained in Williams,
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the result of his criminal proceeding would have been different, that de-
cision would be "diametrically different," "opposite in character or nature," and
"mutually opposed" to our clearly established precedent because we held in
Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability
that... the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Williams, 529 U.S. at 406 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). See also Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694 ("The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself
unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to
have determined the outcome.").
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upon the petitioner' and others merely requiring the court to make its own,
independent determination.' While most of the statutes envision a chain of
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-125(b)(2) (Michie 2001) (petitioner must present prima
facie case that, inter alia, "[tihe evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody
sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in
any material aspect"); DEL. CODE ANN. § 4504(a)(4) (2001) (petitioner must present prima
facie case that, inter alia, "the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody
sufficient to establish that the evidence has not been substituted, tampered with, degraded,
contaminated, altered or replaced in any material aspect"); IDAHO CODE § 19-4902(c)(2) (li-
chie 2002) (petitioner must present prima facie case that, inter alia, "[tlhc evidence to be
tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substi-
tuted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect"); 725 IL. Comp. STAT. §
5/116-3(b)(2) (2002) (petitioner must present prima facie case that, inter alia. "'It]he evidence
to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been
substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect"); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(4)(C) (2001) (petitioner must present prima facie case that, inter alia,
"[t]he evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it
has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in a material way"); MINN. STAT.
§ 590.01(1)(A)(b)(2) (2002) (petitioner must present prima facie case that, inter alia, "the
evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has
not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in a material aspect"); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-1A-1(C)(4) (Michie 2001) (petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that, inter alia, "the evidence he wants the court to order DNA testing upon was secured and
preserved by the law enforcement agency investigating the case"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
35a-301(2)(a) & (b) (2001) (petition must allege, inter alia, that the "evidence has been ob-
tained regarding the person's case which is still in existence and is in a condition that allows
DNA testing to be conducted... [and] the chain of custody is sufficient to establish that the
evidence has not been altered in any material respect"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327. l(A)(ii)
(2001) (petitioner must allege that "the evidence has been subjected to a chain of custody suf-
ficient to establish that the evidence has not been altered, tampered with, or substituted in any
way'). See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4120 (2001) (stating that a petitioner may request test-
ing of biological material which "[ils in the actual or constructive possession or control of the
state or is in possession or control of others under circumstances likely to safeguard the integ-
rity of the biological material's original physical composition").
64. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(B)(2) (2002) (court to find as a prerequisite to testing
that, inter alia, "[tihe evidence is still in existence and is in a condition that allows deoxyribo-
nucleic acid testing'; CAL- PENAL CODE § 1405(0(1) (West 2002) (court to find as a prereq-
uisite to testing that, inter alia, "[the evidence to be tested is still available and in a condition
that would permit the DNA testing requested in the motion."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 4033(c)
(2001 & Supp. 2002) (court to make finding that, inter alia, the evidence is in the "actual or
constructive possession of the District of Columbia or the United States, or has been retained
by any other person or entity under conditions sufficient to establish it has not been substi-
tuted, tampered with, replaced or altered in any materia respect.. ."); FLA. STAT. cI.
925.11(2)(f)(2) (2001) (court to find as a prerequisite to testing that, inter alia, "whether there
exists proof to establish that the evidence has not been materially altered..."); LA. CODE
CRIm. PRoc. ANN. art. 926.1(C)(3) (2002) (court to find as a prerequisite to testing that, inter
alia, "[tihe evidence to be tested is available and in a condition to permit DNA testing"); MD.
CODE ANN., CIM. PRoc. § 8-201(c)(3) (2001) (court to find as a prerequisite to testing that,
inter alia, "the scientific evidence to be tested has been subjected to a chain of custody ...
that is sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or al-
tered in any material aspect"); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a(d)(2) (West 2002) (court to find
as a prerequisite to testing that, inter alia, "the evidence to be tested has been subjected to a
chain of custody... that is sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered
with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect"); S.B. 667, 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-404(2) (2002) (court to order testing upon finding, inter alia, that
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custody to be established and found prior to testing, Michigan requires that
the petitioner establish chain of custody as part of the motion for relief, i.e.,
after testing has been performed and after testing exonerates the petitioner.6'
Both the Missouri and North Carolina statutes are silent concerning chain of
custody issues;' however, the Missouri statute does require that the peti-
tioner allege under oath that the evidence to be tested is available and was
secured in relation to the crime for which testing is requested. 7
In those jurisdictions where the petitioner bears the burden of demon-
strating chain of custody as part of his pleading requirements, it is unclear
how that burden can be met by a person who, by definition, has no access to
the biological material he seeks to test. While one case from Illinois, People
v. Savory," suggests that a petitioner should use his subpoena powers and/or
should seek stipulations and affidavits from relevant state actors in order to
show the chain of custody, this may not be a feasible solution in those in-
stances where state actors are hostile to or skeptical of petitioner's claim.'
Because those statutes which place the burden on the petitioner cast the
burden in terms of a pleading requirement, the ordinary post-conviction peti-
tioner-whose conviction became final years before he contemplated filing a
motion for testing-will lack the jurisdiction of the court prior to the filing
of his pleading to invoke his subpoena power. And, assuming state actors,
for whatever reasons, are unwilling to enter into stipulations or sign affida-
vits regarding chain of custody issues, as the Savory Court suggested, it is
unclear how the petitioner will be able to meet his burden."0
"[t]he evidence is still in existence and in such a condition that DNA analysis may be con-
ducted"); Tx. CODE ANN. CRMI. PROc. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A)(i) & (ii) (2002) (court to order
testing upon finding, inter alia, that "the evidence still exists and is in a condition making
DNA testing possible... and has been subjected to a chain of custody sufficient to establish
that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect").
See also IND. CODE § 35-38-7-8(2)(B) (2001) (requiring court to find, if the sample is in the
possession of a "person" who is not the state or the court, that "a sufficient chain of custody
for the evidence exists to suggest that the evidence has not been substituted, tampered with.
contaminated, or degraded in any material aspect").
65. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16(7)(b) (2002). Thus, in Michigan, a petitioner request-
ing testing must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the evidence is "available"
for testing, and the chain of custody determination is reserved for the subsequent motion for
new trial, assuming testing exonerates. Id. §(3)(b)(i).
66. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.035 (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2002).
67. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 547.035(2)(1) & (2)(2) (2002).
68. People v. Savory, 722 N.E.2d 220 (I1l. App. Ct. 1999), aff'd on other grounds, 756
N.E.2d 804 (2001). As with many other statutes, the Illinois testing statute requires that the
petitioner present a prima facie case that, inter alia, "the evidence to be tested was subject to a
chain of custody .... 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/116-3(b)(2) (2002).
69. But see United States Department of Justice, supra note 5, at 31-42 (recommending,
inter alia, that "[t]he prosecutor should make every effort at cooperation and coordination
with defense counsel once counsel is retained [or appointed]").
70. See also People v. Franks, 752 N.E.2d 1274 (I11. App. Ct. 2001) (pleading require-
ments will be strictly construed); People v. Urioste, 736 N.E.2d 706, 710-11 (I11. App. Ct.
2000) (same). For suggestions on maintenance of the chain of custody during testing. see
United States Department of Justice, supra note 5, at 49-50.
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C. Testing Which Was "Not Available" at the Time of Conviction
Many of these statutes allow for testing upon some sort of demonstra-
tion by the petitioner that such testing was "not available" at the time of trial
or original conviction.71 While "not available" can refer to the actual exis-
tence of the scientific technology-and indeed, some of these statutes re-
strict the definition of "not available" to such a meaning'-other definitions
may be equally plausible.73 For instance, testing may not be available to a
71. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(C)(I)(a) (2002) (court may order testing upon finding,
inter alia, that "[t]he petitioner's verdict or sentence would have been more favorable if the
results of deoxyribonucleic acid testing had been available at the trial."); ARK. CODE ANN,.
§ 16-112-124(a)(1) (Michie 2001) (petitioner must claim, inter alia, that "[s]cientific evi-
dence not available at trial establishes [his] actual innocence"); DEL. CODE ANN. § 4504(a)(2)
(2001) (motion for testing may be granted if, inter alia, [t]he evidence was not previously
subjected to testing because the technology was not available at the time of trial"); 725 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. § 5/116-3(a) (2002). Under the Illinois testing statute,
A defendant may make a motion... for the performance... of... testing on evi-
dence.., which was not subject to the testing which is now requested because the
technology for the testing was not available at the time of trial.
Id See also MD. CODE ANN., CRIm. PRoc. § 8-201(c)(l)(i) (2001) (requiring finding by court
that, inter alia, "the scientific identification evidence was not previously subjected to the
DNA testing that is requested for reasons beyond the control of the petitioner.. .'); MiCH.
CoMe. LAws § 770.16(3)(b)(ii) (2002) (court shall order testing if petitioner presents prima
facie case that, inter alia, "[tihe identified biological material ... was not previously sub-
jected to DNA testing or, if previously tested, will be subject to DNA testing technology that
was not available when the defendant was convicted..."); MwN. STAT. § 590.01(la)(2)
(2002) (motion for testing may be made by an individual if "the evidence [in question] was
not subject to testing because... the testing was not available as evidence at the time of the
trial.. ."); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(1)(i) (2001) (allowing request for testing from peti-
tioner where, inter alia, "the evidence was not known or available...); Wtsc. STAT. §
974.07(2)(c) (2002) ("[t]he evidence... may now be subjected to another test using a scien-
tific technique that was not available and not utilized at the time of the previous testing...').
72. FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11(2)(A)(2) (2001) (petition for testing must include, inter alia
statement that, "the evidence was not previously tested for DNA or a statement that the results
of any previous DNA testing were inconclusive and that subsequent developments in DNA
testing techniques would likely produce a definitive result..."); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-
8(3)(B)(i) (2001) (petitioner must make prima facie demonstration that, inter alia, "[tihe evi-
dence sought to be tested.., was tested, but the requested DNA testing and analysis will...
provide results that are reasonably more discriminating and probative of the identity of the
perpetrator or accomplice. . ."); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c)(l)(ii) (2001) (re-
quiring finding by court that, inter alia, "the type of DNA test being requested is different
from tests previously conducted and would have a reasonable likelihood of providing a more
probative result than tests previously conducted.. ."); MwN. STAT. § 590.01(la)(2) (2002)
(motion for testing may be made by an individual if "the evidence [in question] was not sub-
ject to testing because... the technology for the testing was not available at the time of the
trial.. ."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-4120(1)(c) (2001) (request for testing must allege that bio-
logical material at issue "was not previously subject to DNA testing or can be subject to re-
testing with more current DNA techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of more accu-
rate and probative results."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-IA-1 (Michie 2001); Wtsc. STAT. §
974.07(2)(c) (2002) ("[tlhe evidence... may now be subjected to another test using a scien-
tific technique that was not available and not utilized at the time of the previous testing.. .).
73. But compare 725 ILL. COM. STAT. § 5/116-3(a) (2002) (generic definition of "not
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particular defendant because his counsel ineffectively failed to request such
testing" or because the trial court refused to release funding for the requisite
tests. Or, testing may not have been geographically available to the defen-
dant, insofar as the local laboratory in question may not have had the capa-
bilities to perform the most sophisticated testing.7
Currently, only a handful of testing statutes have mechanisms which ap-
pear to address the potential for multiple meanings of "not available." For
example, in Maryland, testing may be ordered if the petitioner demonstrates
either that "the scientific identification evidence was not previously sub-
jected to the DNA testing that is requested for reasons beyond [his] control"
or that "the type of DNA test being requested is different from tests previ-
ously conducted and would have a reasonable likelihood of providing a more
probative result than tests previously conducted.. ."76 Minnesota employs a
similar standard, allowing a motion when "the evidence [in question] was
not subject to testing because the technology for the testing was not available
at the time of the trial or the testing was not available as evidence at the time
available"), with People v. Barksdale, 762 N.E.2d 669 (Il. App. Ct. 2001) (defining lack of
availability in terms of scientific feasibility); People v. Franks, 752 N.E.2d 1274 (Il. App. Ct.
2001) (same); People v. Rokita, 736 N.E.2d 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (same). See also Arleen
Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims After Herrera v. Collins,
71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 505 (1998). Anderson discusses the Illinois testing statute and ex-
plains:
[Ilt must be shown that the evidence was not subjected to the testing requested be-
cause the technology for such testing was not available at the time of trial. If, for
example, the defendant chose for strategic reasons not to have the testing done at
the time of trial, this remedy is unavailable to him.
Id. (footnote omitted).
74. Additionally, given the promise of these statutes-to ferret out truth through the use
of DNA technology-a plausible argument can be made that the meaning of "not available"
should also include consideration of systematic problems with indigent defense within the
state. To that end, it is instructive that none of the thirty-eight states which currently allow for
imposition of capital punishment meet the "opt-in" requirements under the AEDPA. See 28
U.S.C. § 2261(b) (2002) ('This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by statute, rule of
its court of last resort, or by another agency authorized by state law, a mechanism for the ap-
pointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent coun-
sel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners..."). For a complete
discussion of the AEDPA opt-in litigation, see Burke W. Kappler, Small Favors: Chapter 154
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, The States, and the Right to Counsel, 90
J. CRnvi. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 489-516 (2000). For additional discussion, see Cristina
Stummer, To Be Or Not To Be: Opt-In Status Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 25 VT. L. REV. 603 (2001) (addressing connection between compensation of
counsel and reliability of results within context of Chapter 154); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not For the Worst Crime But For the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALE L. REV. 1835 (1994) (discussing overall systematic sources underlying inadequate rep-
resentation in capital cases).
75. For example, see the definitions of "not available" set forth in the District of Colum-
bia and Virginia testing statutes, which link availability to the ability of local government
laboratories to perform such testing. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4033(a)(3)(A) (2001 & Supp. 2002);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (A)(i) (200 1).
76. MD. CODEANN., CRIM4. PROC. § 8-201(c)(1)(i) & (ii) (2001).
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of the trial." To obtain testing in Missouri, a petitioner must demonstrate,
inter alia, that "[t]he evidence was otherwise unavailable to both the movant
and the movant's trial counsel at the time of trial," ' a construction which
appears to prevent any claim that the evidence was unavailable due to inef-
fective assistance of counsel. In Utah, testing may not be ordered in any
case DNA evidence was not presented at trial for "tactical reasons."' Fi-
nally, in the District of Columbia and in Virginia, the meaning of "not avail-
able" is linked to the geographic availability of such testing.'
D. Identity as an Issue at Trial
While no statute currently has an express exclusion of defendants who
have pleaded guilty, many require the petitioner to prove, as a prerequisite to
testing, that "identity was an issue at trial.'""I This provision logically in-
cludes those petitioners who claim that they were not present at the scene or
77. IvINN. STAT. § 590.01(la)(2) (2002).
78. Mo. REy. STAT. § 547.035(2)(3)(c) (2002) (emphasis added). This definition does
not appear to preclude claims that the evidence was unavailable due to an adverse trial court
ruling, or insufficient defense finding.
79. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(4) (2001).
80. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4033(a)(3)(A) (2001 & Supp. 2002) (evidence in question was
"not previously subjected to DNA testing because DNA testing was not readily available in
criminal cases in the District of Columbia at the time of conviction or adjudication as a delin-
quent"); VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(i) (2001). The Virginia statute requires petitioner to
show,
the evidence was not known or available at the time the conviction became final in
the circuit court or the evidence was not previously subjected to testing because
the testing procedure was not available at the Division of Forensic Sciences at the
time the conviction became final in the circuit court.
Id.
81. IDAHO CODE § 19-4902(c)(1) (Michie 2002) (requiring petitioner to present prima
facie proof that, inter alia, "identity was an issue in the trial"); ME. Ra,. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
2138(E) (2001) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity of
the person... was at issue during the person's trial"); MD. CODE ANN., CUi. PROC. § 8-
201(c)(4) (2001) (requiring petitioner to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity
was an issue in the trial"); MIcH. COMP. LAws § 770.16(3)(b)(iii) (2002) (requiring petitioner
to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the
crime was at issue during his or her trial"); MrNN. STAT. § 590.01(la)(2)(b)(l) (2002) (requir-
ing petitioner to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity was an issue in the trial");
Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.035(4) (2002) (motion for testing must allege, inter alia, that "identity
was an issue at trial); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-1(C)(3) (Michie 2001) (requiring petitioner
to present prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity was an issue in the initial trial"); S.B.
667 § (1)(b)(A)(i), 2001 Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001) (non-mentally retarded defendant must
demonstrate, inter alia, that "identity... was at issue in the trial"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
35a-301(2)(c) (2001) (petitioner must assert, inter alia, a "theory of defense, not inconsistent
with theories previously asserted at trial"); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a(a)(I)(a) (West 2002)
(petitioner to explain, inter alia, "why the identity of the defendant was a significant issue in
the case"). See also 725 ILL. CoMp. STAT. § 5/116-3(b)(1) (2002) (requiring petitioner to pre-
sent prima facie proof that, inter alia, "identity was the issue in the trial") (emphasis added).
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who present certain kinds of antagonistic defenses,' but would logically ex-




In the normal course of litigation, a petitioner can file his petition and
then request discovery of the materials necessary to amplify his claims.
However, in the context of post-conviction requests for DNA testing, the
opposite appears to be true: of the testing statutes in existence, not one
makes mention of discovery, or even appears to contemplate that such a re-
quest may be filed. Thus, even in those jurisdictions in which a petitioner
has the burden of demonstrating a chain of evidence, 4 it is unclear what
mechanism a petitioner may invoke to meet his burden."
Regardless, petitioners should note that many of these testing statutes
are codified as sub-parts of traditional post-conviction statutes; accordingly,
an argument can be made that a petitioner requesting testing enjoys the same
right to discovery under relevant state law as afforded to a traditional post-
conviction petitioner. Moreover, in all post-conviction proceedings, the state
has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, even in the absence of any spe-
cific request for such material.86 And, given the recent recognition of a "due
process right of access to... genetic material for the limited purpose of
DNA testing,"87 petitioners may now argue that the right to discovery as-
82. People v. Urioste, 736 N.E.2d 706, 713-15 (I11. App. Ct. 2000) (identity was at issue
at trial where defendant, who was charged with murder arising from a fatal car accident,
claimed both that his car had been stolen and the act had been committed by another, and that
the state could not prove causation).
83. Gregory W. O'Reilly, Second Chance for Justice: Illinois' Post-Trial Forensic Test-
ing Law, 81 JUDICATURE 114 (Nov./Dec. 1997) (discussing "identity was an issue at trial"
provision in Illinois statute). Regardless, as all of the statutes with this requirement, save one,
cast the identity showing as "an issue," petitioners who may have presented antagonistic de-
fenses at trial are not precluded from seeking testing because identity was not the only issue
raised at trial. See Urioste, 736 N.E.2d at 713-15.
84. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
85. Prior to the enactment of the statutes discussed in this article, many petitioners relied
on the theories underlying Brady v. Maryland to gain access to information required for a test-
ing request. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges of Scien-
tific Evidence, 108 HARV. L.R. 1557 (1995).
86. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976) ("[A]fter a conviction the prose-
cutor also is bound by the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate authority of af-
ter-acquired or other information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction.")
(citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1969) and American Bar Associa-
tion Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution and Defense Function § 3.11 (Ap-
proved Draft 1971)); Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 730 (11 th Cir. 1987) (remanding for evi-
dentiary hearing on claim of Brady violation; state court's failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence after in camera hearing violated defendant's right to due process).
87. Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366
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sumes constitutional dimensions, even in the face of the testing statute's si-
lence regarding discovery.
B. Preservation of Evidence
At the heart of all of these DNA cases is the biological evidence. How-
ever, many of these statutes fail to adequately address the issue of evidence
preservation, to the petitioner's detriment."
Generally speaking, these new statutes follow four main approaches to
preservation, with several statutes hybridizing these approaches." First, and
as a baseline, some statutes do not even contemplate preservation, which
presumably means that the petitioner must expressly request preservation
upon filing his request for testing.9' Second, in those instances where some
sort of preservation is contemplated, the state can be required to preserve the
evidence retroactively,9 quasi-retroactively,' prospectively,93 or prospec-
(E.D. Pa. 2001). Bruce Godschalk was the one hundred and second wrongfully convicted
prisoner released from incarceration. For a case profile, see httpJ/www.innoccnceproject.org
(last visited Apr. 6, 2002).
88. The Supreme Court has twice held that the State has no obligation to preserve evi-
dence. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (absent demonstration of bad faith, fail-
ure to preserve biological evidence did not violate defendant's due process rights); California
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (due process does not require State to preserve breatha-
lyzer samples). See also generally Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges
of Scientific Evidence, supra note 85 (discussing preservation issues, Youngblood, and Trom-
betta in the absence of a state testing statute).
89. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(H) (2002) (prospective preservation upon filing of
petition for testing with sanctions provisions for "intentional" destruction of evidence after
court-ordered preservation); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1103 (Michie 2001) (prospective
preservation for sexual and "violent" offenses only, with permissive destruction after notice to
defendant and petition to court; statute also provides for criminal penalties for failure to com-
ply with any aspect of preservation provision); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1417.9 (West 2002) (pro-
spective preservation with permissive destruction after notice to defendant and petition to
court and criminal penalties for failure to comply with preservation mechanisms; preservation
statute expires on January 1, 2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11(4) (2001) (quasi-retroactive pres-
ervation; evidence may be destroyed after certain time provisions expire and after notice to
defendant and other relevant parties); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-14 (2001) (prospective preserva-
tion upon filing of petition for testing, with "appropriate sanctions" to be imposed if state ac-
tor destroys evidence after court-ordered preservation); LA. CODE CRUM. PRoc. ANN. art.
926.1(H)(3), (4) & (6) (2002) (prospective application upon filing a request for testing in non-
capital cases and mandatory retroactive preservation in all capital cases; no criminal or civil
liability on any state actor who destroys evidence "[e]xcept in the case of willful or wanton
misconduct or gross negligence"); MD. CODE ANN., CR i. PROC. §§ 8-201(i) & (j) (2001)
(quasi-retroactive preservation mechanism with destruction after notice to defendant, any at-
torney of record, and local Public Defender, defendant may stop destruction by filing objec-
tions with convicting court and securing court order).
90. Da CODE AN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2001) (no preservation mechanism); 725 ILL Co.\u.
STAT. § 5/116-3 (2002) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a (West 2002) (same); N.Y.
CRim. PRoc. LAw § 440.30 (Consol. 2001) (same).
91. E.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN,. art. 926.1(-)(4) (2002) (mandatory retroactive
preservation in capital cases only).
92. As used in this Article, "quasi-retroactively" refers to a non-absolute form of retroac-
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tively after the petitioner files his request for testing." Third, and in spite of
any requirement for preservation, the state may be permitted to destroy bio-
logical evidence after meeting certain surreal requirements.95 Finally, in cer-
tain circumstances, the state may be penalized for destruction of evidence in
violation of the statute.96
tive preservation which requires state actors to preserve evidence in those cases where a peti-
tion for testing may be filed in future. Presumably, these state actors will have far more re-
strictive views as to what will be a viable case than a defense attorney. See, e.g., FLA. SrAr.
ch. 925.11(4) (2001) (state must maintain physical evidence in any case where "postsentenc-
ing testing of DNA may be requested...") (emphasis added); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
2137(14) (West 2001) ("Effective October 15, 2001, the investigating law enforcement
agency shall preserve any biological evidence identified during the investigation of a crime or
crimes for which any person may file a postjudgment of conviction motion for DNA analysis
under this section.") (emphasis added); MD. CODE ANN., CRUM. PROC. § 8-201(i) (2001) (re-
quiring state to preserve evidence for three years after imposition of sentence).
93. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1103 (Michie 2001) (requiring preservation of "any physi-
cal evidence" secured during the prosecution of any "sex offense" or "violent offense"); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 4034(a) (2001 & Supp. 2002) (requiring evidence be preserved for "5 years or
as long as any person incarcerated in connection with that case or investigation remains in
custody, whichever is longer...").
94. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(H) (2002) ("If a petition is filed pursuant to this section,
the court shall order the state to preserve during the pendency of the proceeding all evidence
in the state's possession or control that could be subjected to deoxyribonucleic acid testing.");
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1417.9(b)(2)(A) (West 2002) (petitioner can prevent destruction of evi-
dence by filing motion for testing); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-14 (2001) ("If a petition for DNA
testing an analysis is filed under this chapter: (1) the court shall order the state to preserve
during the pendency of the proceedings all evidence in the state's possession or control that
could be subjected to DNA testing an analysis...").
95. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1417.9(b)(2)(A), (B) & (C) (West 2002) (permitting destruc-
tion after notice to defendant, any counsel of record, the local public defender and prosecutor,
and the Attorney General; defendant may prevent destruction by (A) filing a petition for test-
ing under § 1405, (B) by requesting that the material not be destroyed due because a motion
under § 1405 will be filed within one hundred and eighty (180) days, or (C) by filing a "decla-
ration of innocence" within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the judgment of convic-
tion); FLA. STAT. ch. 925.1 l(1)(b) & (4) (2001) (linking time that evidence must be preserved
to the time restrictions on filing of petition for testing; when time has expired, state may de-
stroy evidence after notice to defendant, any counsel of record, prosecuting attorney, and the
Attorney General; defendant may prevent destruction either sending state a copy of a petition
for DNA testing or requesting that evidence be preserved because timely petition for testing
will be filed in future); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(j) (2001) (permitting destruc-
tion after notice to defendant, any attorney of record, and local Public Defender; defendant
may stop destruction by filing objections with convicting court and securing court order).
96. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(H) (2002) ("[l f evidence is intentionally destroyed after
the court orders its preservation, the court may impose appropriate sanctions, including crimi-
nal contempt, for a knowing violation."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1103 (Michie 2001)
(class A misdemeanor for violation of any aspect of preservation provision); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 4034(d) (2001 & Supp. 2002). The District of Columbia statute provides,
Whoever willfully or maliciously destroys, alters, conceals, or tampers with evi-
dence that is required to be preserved ... with the intent to (1) impair the integrity
of that evidence, (2) prevent that evidence from being subjected to DNA testing, or
(3) prevent the production or use of that evidence in an official proceedings, shall
be subject to a fine of$100,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.
Id. See also IND. CODE § 35-38-7-14(3) (2001) ("appropriate sanctions" to be imposed if state
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While a statute that provides preservation mechanisms is quite obvi-
ously more desirable than one which does not, it is unclear how these pres-
ervation mechanisms, as currently drafted, will substantively affect post-
conviction innocence cases. The most obvious question underlying these
preservation provisions is whether they really work: if a state actor is in-
clined to destroy evidence, will a statute mandating preservation really pre-
vent him from taking action?"
Second, given the loopholes in the quasi-retroactive and prospective-
upon-filing preservation approaches-which are included in a handful of the
current statutes-the issue of "bad faith" destruction will rarely, if ever,
arise." For example, under one interpretation of the quasi-retroactive pres-
ervation statutes, the state is only required to preserve evidence in those
cases which it deems potentially viable. If the prosecutor stands by his case
and orders destruction of the evidence, he may well be in full compliance
with the statute." Even more disturbing are those jurisdictions where the
state is only required to preserve evidence after the petitioner has filed his
request for testing; theoretically, all evidence in these jurisdictions could be
destroyed in one fell swoop.
Moreover, the obvious loopholes associated with the preservation ap-
proaches currently in existence underscores the need for careful planning be-
actor destroys evidence after court-ordered preservation); LA. CODE CRs. PROc. A,. art.
926.1(H)(6) (2002) (no criminal or civil liability on any state actor who destroys evidence
"[e]xcept in the case of willful or wanton misconduct or gross negligence").
97. By raising this question, it is not the intention of the author to paint all prosecutors or
state actors with a wide, "bad faith" brush. However, prosecutorial misconduct does occur,
and it would be naive to assume that it does not.
98. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (absent demonstration of bad faith, fail-
ure to preserve biological evidence by state actors prior to the time of trial did not violate de-
fendant's due process rights). Larry Youngblood was eventually exonerated in August of
2000. See also People v. Barksdale, 762 N.E.2d 669 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
Because Youngblood requires that a defendant show that potentially exculpatory
evidence was destroyed in bad faith. . .prior to his conviction, we find that a de-
fendant should also be held to the same showing... in order to establish a viola-
tion of his due process rights when new, potentially exculpatory evidence is de-
stroyed after his conviction.
Id. at 683 (emphasis in original).
99. But see People v. Cress, 2002 WL 272733 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2002). Cress
was convicted in 1985 of the 1983 rape and murder of Patricia Rosansky. However, since the
time of Cress' conviction, a second individual-Michael Ronning-has admitted his in-
volvement in the crime. Ronning's potential involvement in Rosanky's murder was brought
to the attention of Cress' prosecutors by police investigators, who nonetheless signed an order
for the destruction of evidence in Cress' case. After years of litigation, and following Young-
blood, the Michigan Court of Appeals recently granted Cress a new trial, and ordered that his
jury be instructed that if it determines the evidence in question was destroyed in bad faith. "it
may infer that the destroyed, potentially exculpatory evidence would have been favorable to
[Cress]." Id. While Cress' case provides some hope for petitioners in jurisdictions without
preservation mechanisms, his case is also unique because of Ronning's confession and the
unwavering support of the retired police officer who took Ronning's confession and relayed it
to Cress' prosecutors.
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tween traditional and new post-conviction remedies, because without such
planning, a prisoner may be left without any evidence to test and without any
statutory vehicle by which to challenge his conviction and/or sentence.
C. Laboratories
In general, the testing statutes follow three approaches to laboratories:
those which mandate the use of state labs,'" those which contemplate the use
of private labs,"°' and those which are ambiguous as to whether state or pri-
vate lab may be used."
While the most obvious problem associated with the use of state labora-
tories is the fact that so many of the recent exonerations are linked to abuse
within government laboratories-begging the question of why a petitioner
would want to pursue testing at a government facility-there are other prob-
lems as well. First and foremost, what if a state lab lacks the capabilities
and/or talent to perform the testing in question? Insofar as the District of
Columbia and Virginia link the meaning of "not available" to laboratory ca-
pabilities,' petitioners may want to make in-court inquiries of their state lab
facilities before blindly agreeing to have a state laboratory perform the test-
ing. Second, petitioners will certainly want to investigate the lab's accredi-
tation-not only that the lab is accredited, but what that accreditation actu-
ally means.
100. FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (West 2001).
101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(F) (2002) ("the court shall select a laboratory that
meets the standards of the deoxyribonucleic acid advisory board to conduct the testing...");
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2002); IND. CODE §§ 35-38-7-1 to -19 (2001); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., CREv. PRoc. § 8-201 (2001); Micil.
COMP. LAWS § 770.16 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4117 to -4125 (2001); S.B. 667, 2001
Leg., 71st Sess. (Or. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-410 (2002) (selected lab must meet
standards adopted in 42 U.S.C. § 14131); Tex. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. art. 64.03 (2002);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-35a-301 to -304 (2001).
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 4504 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (2002); N.M. STA-r.
ANN. § 31-IA-1 (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-401 to -409 (2002).
103. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4033(a)(3)(A) (2001 & Supp. 2002) (evidence in question was
"not previously subjected to DNA testing because DNA testing was not readily available in
criminal cases in the District of Columbia at the time of conviction or adjudication as a delin-
quent"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(i) (2001). In explaining the meaning of "not avail-
able, the Virginia statute contemplates that
the evidence was not known or available at the time the conviction became final in
the circuit court or the evidence was not previously subjected to testing because
the testing procedure was not available at the Division of Forensic Sciences at the
time the conviction became final in the circuit court.
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D. Costs of Testing
Cost is an issue addressed by most, but not all, of the testing statutes."
Under most schemes, the petitioner is required to pay the cost of testing,
unless he is indigent. Notably absent from the vast majority of statutes,
however, are separate appropriations provisions to pay for the cost of testing
for indigent prisoners; in fact, only a handful of states appear to have enacted
appropriations to pay for testing." Moreover, given that in many states,
104. Compare ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(D) (2002) (if testing is ordered. "court shall
order the method and responsibility for payment, if necessary... [including requiring] the
petitioner to pay the costs of testing.. ."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(i)(1) (West 2002) (costs
"to be borne by the state or the applicant, as the court may order in the interests of justice,"
but noting that cost of re-testing may not be imposed on the petitioner): DEL_ CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4504(e) (2001) ("The cost of DNA testing... shall be borne by the state or the appli-
cant, as the court may order in the interests of justice, if it is shown that the applicant is not
indigent and possesses the means to pay."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 4033(e)(1) (2001 & Supp.
2002) (costs to be paid by the District of Columbia if petitioner is indigent; otherwise, costs to
be borne by petitioner); FLA. STAT. ch. 943.3251(2) (2001) (cost of testing to be assessed
against petitioner, unless he is indigent); IDAHO CODE § 19-4902(f) (Michie 2002) (cost of
testing to be assessed against petitioner, unless he is indigent); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-10
(2001) (court to order payment of costs associated with testing; no mention of finding of indi-
gency by the court); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(7) (2001) (cost of testing to be as-
sessed against petitioner, unless he is indigent); MD. CODE ANN., CRL5. PROC. § 8-201(g)(I)
& (2) (2001) (cost of testing to be assessed against petitioner, unless he is indigent; if testing
exonerate, costs to be assessed against the state); MicH. CoMP. LAws § 770.16(5) (2002) (cost
of testing to be assessed against petitioner, unless he is indigent)- MtN. STAT. § 590.05
(2002) ("Indigent Prisoners"); NEB. STAT. § 29-4121 (2001) (addressing issue of costs); N.J.
STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32a(g) (West 2002) (petitioner to pay costs associated with testing; no
mention of finding of indigency by the court); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-1(F) (Michie 2001)
("The district court may order the petitioner to pay for the expense of the DNA testing.");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2002) ("The defendant shall be responsible for bearing the cost
of any DNA testing.., unless the court determines the defendant is indigent, in which event
the State shall bear the costs."); S.B. 667 § (5)(a) & (b), 2001 Leg., 71" Sess. (Or. 2001) (peti-
tioner to pay for testing unless counsel is appointed; appointment of counsel predicated upon
finding of indigency); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-406 (2002) (payment borne by State or peti-
tioner, depending on substantive findings as set forth in §§ 404 and 405); TEx. CODE A.N,,.
CRIM. PRoc. art. 64.03(d) (2002) (costs to be borne by petitioner if state lab, or lab under con-
tract to state, is not used for testing); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(8) (2001) (cost of test-
ing to be assessed against petitioner, unless he is indigent; if testing fails to exclude, indigent
petitioner ma be forced to reimburse State); Wisc. STAT. § 974.07(12)(a) (2002) (costs to be
borne by petitioner, unless indigent); with ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-124 to -129 (Michie
2001) (no mention of payment of costs, but requiring testing to be performed by the State
Crime Laboratory); 725 ILL COMP. STAT. § 5/116-3 (2002) (no mention of payment of costs);
LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 926.1 (2002) (same); Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.035 (2002)
(same); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (Consol. 2001) (same); VA. CODE A'N. § 19.2-
327.1 (2001) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2002) (same).
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(i)(2) (West 2002) ("In order to pay for the State's share
of any testing costs, the laboratory... shall present its bill for services to the superior court
for approval and payment. It is the intent of the Legislature to appropriate funds for this pur-
pose in the 2000-01 Budget Act."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(8) (2001 & Supp. 2002)
(adopting Fiscal Impact Statement); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1(K) (2002)
("There is hereby created in the state treasury a special fund designated as the DNA Testing
Post-Conviction Relief for Indigents.. ."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30413 (2002) ("Payment
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prosecutions are handled on a county-wide level, a statute which mandates
that the "state" pay for testing may face real problems when bills for testing
come due.
V. STANDARDS FOR RELIEF
Surprisingly, less than half of the testing statutes address the issue of
what should and will happen when testing exonerates." In those jurisdic-
tions where the testing statute is silent regarding relief, a petitioner will pre-
sumably make some sort of request for relief after the testing exonerates
him. However, it is unknown whether the petitioner will be required to
make an additional evidentiary showing, as is required under the Maine and
Michigan statutes, or whether some other set of requirements will be im-
posed."
for analysis from criminal injuries compensation fund").
106. ARMz. REv. STAT. § 13-4240(K) (2002) (if results are favorable, court shall order a
hearing "and make any further orders that are required pursuant to this article or the Arizona
Rules of Criminal Procedure"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(b) (2001) (petitioner may file
motion for new trial); D.C. CODE ANN. § 4035 (2001 & Supp. 2002) ("Motion to vacate a
conviction or grant a new trial on the ground of actual innocence"); FLA. R. CRIM. PROC.
3.853(d)(2) (West 2002) (post-conviction petition, filed pursuant to traditional post-
conviction statute and which alleges innocence on the basis of testing which exonerates,
"shall be treated as raising a claim of newly-discovered evidence and the time periods set
forth in rules 3.850 and 3.851 shall commence on the date that the written test results are pro-
vided to the court, the movant, and the prosecuting authority.. ."); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-19
(2001) (describing procedures to be followed when testing results are "favorable" to peti-
tioner); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2138(8)(B)(1), (2) & (3) (2001) (describing addi-
tional evidentiary showings to be made by petitioner, if testing is favorable); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(h)(2)(i) & (ii) (2001) (if testing is favorable to petitioner, court to either
re-open traditional post-conviction proceedings, or, if traditional post-conviction was never
pursued by petitioner, court to open new proceedings); MICH. Com',. LAWS §§ 770.16(7)(a),
(b) & (c) (2002) (describing additional evidentiary showings to be made by petitioner, if test-
ing is favorable); Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.037 (2002) (describing show cause procedures for
granting relief); NEB. STAT. § 29-4123(2) & (3) (2001) (describing procedures for petitioning
for grant of relief; if court denies relief, petitioner may request relief pursuant to traditional
post-conviction remedies); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-412 (2002) (court to conduct "hearing"
is test results are favorable to petitioner); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-303 (2001) (setting forth
procedures when test results are favorable to petitioner); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.2 (2002)
(describing issuance "writ of actual innocence," effective November 15, 2002); WIsc. STAT. §
974.07(10)(a) (2002) (setting forth procedures when test results are favorable to petitioner).
107. Under the Michigan statute, a petitioner is required to show-in addition to the
demonstrations necessary to obtain testing in the first instance:
(a) That only the perpetrator of the crime or crimes for which the defendant was
convicted could be the source of the identified biological material.
(b) That the identified biological material was collected, handled, and preserved by
procedures that allow the court to find that the identified biological material is not
contaminated or is not so degraded that the DNA profile of the tested sample of the
identified biological material cannot be determined to be identical to the DNA pro-
file of the sample initially collected during the investigation...
(c) That the defendant's purported exclusion as the source of the identified bio-
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For example, to obtain testing under the California statute, a petitioner
must meet two substantive pleading requirements: he must explain "why the
identity of the perpetrator was, or should have been, a significant issue in the
case" and why, "in light of all the evidence, how the requested DNA testing
would raise a reasonable probability that [his] verdict or sentence would be
more favorable if the results of the DNA testing had been available at the
time of the conviction."" This showing is certainly far lower than the re-
quirements of the Maine and Michigan statutes, which require, inter alia, a
demonstration that "only the perpetrator of the crime" could be the source of
the biological material."° One can imagine a factual scenario where the peti-
tioner could meet the California "reasonable probability" standard but not
the more stringent "only the perpetrator" standard, which begs the question
of the type of demonstration a California petitioner be required to make after
testing excludes him? Certainly, the State would be expected to argue that
the petitioner prove something more than a "reasonable probability."
Moreover, what will be the legal avenue for pursuing such a remedy-
traditional post-conviction or some sort of common law writ? If the peti-
tioner seeks relief under traditional post-conviction remedies, will his post-
testing petition for relief be considered a successive petition? While a strong
argument can be made that it will not, the arguments presented by the State
of Illinois in People v. Barksdale... and People v. Rokita"' demonstrate that
such successor arguments may well arise under such scenarios.
Finally, regardless of whether the testing statute in effect has mecha-
nisms for requesting relief or not, there is an issue as to how any post-testing
request for relief will interact with traditional post-conviction's wary view of
free-standing claims of actual innocence." '2 While the Court in Herrera rec-
ognized the possibility of such claims, they are-at least in the context of
traditional post-conviction remedies-hopelessly mired in complex proce-
dural rules. 13 Thus, in those jurisdictions with testing statutes which do not
logical material, balanced against the other evidence in the case, is sufficient to
justify the grant of a new trial.
MIcH. COMP. LAws §§ 770.16(7)(a), (b) & (c) (2002).
The requirements under the Maine statute are materially identical. See ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2138(8)(B)(1), (2) & (3) (2001).
108. CAL. PENALCODE §§ 1405(c)(1)(A) & (B) (West 2002) (emphasis added).
109. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 770.16(7)(a) (2002) (emphasis added); ME. REv. STAT. A.,N.
tit. 15, § 2138(8)(B)(1) (2001).
110. 2001 WL 1665125 (111. App. CL Dec. 31, 2001). See infra note 123.
111. 736 N.E.2d 205 (111. App. CL 2000). See infra note 123.
112. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993) ("Few rulings would be more disrup-
tive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of
actual innocence.").
113. E.g., Larry Yackle, Congressional Power to Require DNA Testing, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1173, 1183 (2001) (discussing Herrera and explaining that "most precedents understand
the Constitution chiefly to protect innocent people indirectly-by demanding that criminal
prosecutions adhere to federal procedural safeguards meant to avoid erroneous convictions in
the first place?'); Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of Innocence for Death-
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delineate a specific showing for a grant of relief, petitioners should be aware
of the traditional post-conviction's view of innocence, lest those require-
ments be imposed.
VI. RETESTING, REHEARING, AND APPEAL
In spite of shocking revelations about the state serologists in West Vir-
ginia,"4 Oklahoma, and Illinois, and in spite of the fact that many testing
statutes require use of state laboratories,"' no testing statute expressly allows
a petitioner to petition for re-testing once he is included by the initial test-
ing.1 6 However, in a handful of jurisdictions, the state is allowed to move
for re-testing when the petitioner is excluded: in some instances, the State
must make some sort of showing before re-testing is ordered,"7 but in other
instances, re-testing is mandatory upon request by the State."8 While no
statute provides for re-testing upon motion by the petitioner, a few statutes
provide that a petitioner may move for rehearing after an adverse result."9
VII. SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS
In the realm of post-conviction law, a "successive" petition is any peti-
tion filed under the same statute and after the first petition. While only some
of the extant testing statutes contemplate the filing of successive petitions,
20
Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM, & MARY L. REv. 943 (1994) (reviewing proce-
dural complexities associated with Herrera and claims of innocence made in habeas cases).
114. Matter of Investigation of West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory, Serology
Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1993).
115. FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (West 2001).
116. IND. CODE § 35-38-7-18(1) (2001) (mandating dismissal of petition if "results of
the post-conviction DNA testing and analysis are not favorable to the person who was con-
victed of the offense"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(8)(A) (2001) ("If the results of
the DNA analysis are inconclusive or show that the person is the source of the evidence, the
court shall deny any motion for a new trial."); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(h)(1)
(2001) ("If the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are unfavorable to the petitioner,
the court shall dismiss the petition."); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16(6) (2002) (mandating de-
nial of motion for new trial if test results are "inconclusive or show that the defendant is the
course of the identified material");
117. E.g., IND. CODE §§ 35-38-7-1 to -19(1) (2001) (retesting upon showing of "good
cause" by prosecutor).
118. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(9) (2001) (court "shall" order retesting upon
motion by State); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16(8) (2002) (court "shall" order retesting upon
motion by State).
While the California statute make no express provision for re-testing by the state, it is
clearly contemplated within the statute. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(i)(1) (West 2002) ("[Tlhe
cost of any additional testing to be conducted by the district attorney or Attorney General
shall not be borne by the convicted individual.").
119. FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11(3)(c) (2001) ("The sentenced defendant may file a motion for
rehearing of any order denying relief within 15 days of service of the order denying relief.").
120. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-112-128(5)(d) (Michie 2001) (providing for dismissal of
successive petitions "if the issues raised in it have previously been decided by the Court of
[Vol. 38
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and under what circumstances, there has been a growing trend in traditional
post-conviction law to eliminate the availability of successive petitions."
Thus, even though the majority of the testing statutes do not speak to succes-
sive petitions, traditional post-conviction concepts may inform the manner in
which courts will address them.
For example, what happens when the first testing petition is considered
a successive petition, simply because the petitioner has sought traditional
post-conviction relief in the past? While case law from Illinois indicates that
a testing petition filed under these circumstances will not be considered suc-
cessive, the holdings in these cases rest on the fact that DNA testing was
"not available" at the time of the traditional post-conviction filings. Ac-
cordingly, in a case with a shortened time frame-i.e., one where DNA test-
Appeals or The Supreme Court in the same case.. ."); IDAHO CODE § 19-2719(5)(b) (Michie
2002) ("A successive post-conviction pleading... shall be deemed facially insufficient to the
extent it alleges matters that are cumulative or impeaching or would not, even if the allega-
tions were true, cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction or sentence"); id. § 19-
2719(5)(c) ("A successive post-conviction pleading... shall be deemed facially insufficient
to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law").
121. While a state-by-state history of successive petition litigation is beyond the scope of
this Article, the basic trends are described in LiEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 17, at 1259-1346
(§ 28, "Successive Petitions"); Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in tre Carpet, 78 TEx. L REv.
1731, 1740-42 (2000) (discussing evolution of treatment of successive petitions from Warren
Court through Rehnquist Court).
122. See People v. Barksdale, 762 N.E.2d 669 (II!. App. Ct. 2001); People v. Rokita. 736
N.E.2d 205 (I. App. Ct. 2000). Read together, these cases demonstrate how traditional post-
conviction concepts will inform and affect motions for testing. In Barksdale, for example, the
appellant challenged the denial of his motion for testing of evidence collected as part of his
1972 convictions for rape, deviate sexual assault, and aggravated kidnapping. Barksdale had
pursued his direct appeal, and an unsuccessful state post-conviction petition. Thereafter, in
2000, he filed a second post-conviction petition pro se, requesting testing of certain biological
material. Barksdale, 762 N.E.2d at 672. While it is unclear if Barksdale invoked the Illinois
testing statute in his filing, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/116-3, the substance of his request ap-
pears to have been enough to alert the court that § 116-3 applied to his request. See Barksdale,
762 N.E.2d at 672. Regardless, the trial court dismissed. On appeal, the State argued that
Barksdale's petition for testing was really a successive petition, barred by Illinois state law
governing traditional post-conviction filings. Id. at 674-75. The appellate court disagreed;
however, much of the court's opinion is premised on the fact that DNA testing would not
have been "available" to Barksdale at the time his first traditional post-conviction petition was
filed. See id. at 676.
Rokita is not dissimilar. In Rokira, the petitioner was convicted in 1994 and thereafter,
unsuccessfully pursued his direct appeal and traditional post-conviction remedies. In April
1999, Rokia requested "PCR" testing under § 116-3, failing to further specify the type of test-
ing requested in his pleadings. Rokita, 736 N.E.2d at 208. Despite clarifying at an evidentiary
hearing that he was seeking STR-based PCR testing, which the state conceded was not avail-
able at the time of Rokita's trial, the trial court dismissed the petition because of its finding
that testing would not ultimately exonerate Rokita and its apparent belief in his guilt. Id. The
court also.expressed concern that "Rokita was utilizing § 116-3 to in an effort to file a second
postconviction petition and that defendants might continually seek DNA testing under section
116-3 each time a new DNA test was developed, resulting in a lack of finality to their convic-
tions." Id. On appeal, the court reversed, finding that the type of testing sought by Rokita
STR-based PCR testing, had not been available at the time of trial and that testing was
accordingly warranted. Id. at 213.
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ing was "available" but inexplicably not pursued at the time the petitioner
seeks traditional post-conviction review-a strong argument can be made
that the motion for testing is in actuality a successive petition.
Successor issue may also be invoked when a petitioner fails to meet
pleading standards and then later files a proper petition. In People v.
Franks, 3 for example, the petitioner failed to allege-as required by the Il-
linois statute-that the testing was "not available" at the time of his original
trial. "'24 As a result, his petition was dismissed. On appeal, the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court held that the petitioner's motion was "wholly insufficient" to
satisfy the statute's pleading requirements, and affirmed the trial court's
dismissal.' Distinguishing People v. Rokita,26 in which the state had con-
ceded the lack of availability of certain testing at a hearing on the peti-
tioner's motion, the Franks court made clear that a petition that fails to meet
prima facie pleading requirements will be properly dismissed. While there is
no indication that the petitioner in Franks ever tried to file a second motion
for testing, the language in Rokita and Barksdale regarding successive peti-
tions underscores the need for petitioners to be cautious in filing their plead-
ings.
27
VIII. OTHER FORMS OF TESTING
Most, but not all, of the current statutes are limited specifically to DNA
testing; however, some statutes also make mention of post-conviction testing
of fingerprints.12 Given recent challenges to the admissibility of fingerprint




Clearly, there is no such thing as a perfect testing statute. Partly, this is
due to the extraordinary factual complexity of criminal cases, i.e., a testing
statute may work wonderfully for one petitioner, but may prevent another
123. 752 N.E.2d 1274 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
124. Franks, 752 N.E.2d at 1275-76 (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/116-3 (2002)).
125. Franks, 752 N.E.2d at 1276.
126. Rokita, 736 N.E.2d 205.
127. This concern is especially true in those jurisdictions where the testing statute is
codified as part of the State's traditional post-conviction statute.
128. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-125 (Michie 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (Michic
2002); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/116-3 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (2002); NEB. STAT. §§
29-4117 to -4125 (2001) (referring to "DNA or similar forensic testing"); VA. CODE ANN.
§19.2-327.1 (2001) (referring to "new scientific investigation of any human biological evi-
dence"); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2002); Wisc. STAT. § 974.07 (2002).
129. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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petitioner from even filing his request.' However, the lack of perfection in
the extant testing statutes is largely attributable to their inability to address
the complexities of state and federal post-conviction law. Petitioners seek-
ing testing will thus want to familiarize themselves with relevant post-
conviction law, both within their respective states and federally, to ensure
that the trappings of traditional post-conviction litigation do not bar their op-
portunities both under the testing statutes, and in traditional post-conviction.
130. Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853. 2001 WL
1276878 at * 4-5 (Fla. Oct. 18, 2001) (Anstead, concurring and dissenting, discussing how
exonerated defendant Jerry Frank Townsend would not be able to avail himself of the Florida
testing statute, given its ban on petitions from defendants who pleaded guilty).
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